Navigating the fallout from Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys – Howden’s view
Published
Written by
Read time
Introduction
On 16 September 2025, Mr Justice Sheldon handed down a judgment that has sent shockwaves through the legal profession. In Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) (“Mazur”), the High Court delivered an unequivocal ruling: mere employment by an authorised law firm does not entitle non-authorised individuals to conduct litigation, even under supervision.
The case arose from a debt recovery claim brought by Charles Russell Speechlys LLP (represented by Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors) for non-payment of fees against Mrs Julia Mazur and Mr Jerome Stuart. Mrs Mazur and Mr Stuart challenged the involvement of Peter Middleton, a non-qualified fee earner who had signed the Particulars of Claim and conducted virtually all of the steps in the claim.
This judgment matters because it fundamentally disrupts a widespread practice in law firms across England and Wales. For years, firms – particularly those specialising in high-volume litigation such as debt recovery, personal injury – have relied on paralegals, Chartered Legal Executives without litigation rights, trainees, and other non-qualified staff to run cases under supervision. Mazur makes clear that this model risks criminal liability under section 14 of the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA), potential regulatory sanctions by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), and costs recovery challenges.
Below we examine the pre-judgment legal framework, analyse the core findings and implications of the Mazur decision, and provide recommendations for firms to ensure compliance moving forwards.
The legal position before the judgment
Before Mazur, the statutory framework governing who could conduct litigation was set out in the Legal Services Act 2007. Section 12(1)(b) of the LSA designates "the conduct of litigation" as a reserved legal activity. Schedule 2, paragraph 4 defines this as:
- the issuing of proceedings before any court in England and Wales;
- the commencement, prosecution and defence of such proceedings; and
- the performance of any ancillary functions in relation to such proceedings (such as entering appearances to actions).
Section 13 establishes that a person may only carry out a reserved legal activity if they are either an "authorised person" (defined in section 18 as someone authorised by a relevant approved regulator, such as the SRA) or an "exempt person" (defined in section 19 and Schedule 3). Section 14 makes it a criminal offence to carry on a reserved legal activity without entitlement. Significantly, section 16 provides that an employer commits an offence if their employee carries on a reserved legal activity without being entitled to do so – even if the employer itself is authorised.
The supervision ambiguity
Despite this framework, a critical ambiguity existed: can non-authorised employees conduct litigation under the supervision of an authorised solicitor? Many firms have been operating on the assumption that they can. This belief was reinforced by:
- CPR Part 2.3, which defines "legal representative" to include "a solicitor's employee…who has been instructed to act for a party in relation to proceedings";
- Industry practice, particularly in high-volume litigation sectors where non-qualified staff routinely issue proceedings, draft statements of case, file directions questionnaires, and instruct counsel – all tasks ostensibly "supervised" by a qualified solicitor; and
- Limited regulatory guidance: The SRA's public guidance is limited, save for a brief comment in its guidance on effective supervision published in November 2022 under the heading: “Reserved legal activities – litigation”. Also, some practitioners (and the SRA – see further below) have interpreted section 21(3) of the LSA – which brings employees of authorised persons within the SRA's regulatory remit – as conferring authorisation by extension.
Also, as noted at paragraph 22 of the judgment, the conduct of litigation under supervision was always permitted prior to the LSA, and it did not purport to change the pre-existing law, but it seemingly inadvertently did, although few seem to have realised this.
Pre-Mazur case law
Two cases provided limited guidance but did not directly address the supervision question:
- SRA v Khan [2021] EWHC 3765 (Ch): Fancourt J held that section 16 of the LSA makes clear "there is a separate requirement for the employer body and the employee to be entitled to carry on the reserved legal activity". However, Khan involved a solicitor who had been struck off and was not about non-qualified staff.
- Baxter v Doble [2023] EWHC 486 (QB): Cavanagh J emphasised that the definition of "conduct of litigation" under the LSA is narrower than might be supposed and "has been interpreted narrowly and does not extend beyond formal steps in the litigation".
However, neither Khan nor Baxter explicitly dealt with whether supervision by an authorised person could legitimise an unauthorised employee conducting litigation.
The gap addressed by Mazur
The critical gap was this: while the LSA clearly required individual authorisation or exemption to conduct litigation, it did not expressly address whether "supervision" created an exemption. Some firms and even the SRA itself appeared to believe it did. The SRA's initial decision letter dated 2 December 2024 (which was mentioned in the judgment) stated that employees of authorised firms "are permitted to undertake reserved legal activities due to section 21(3)"—a position the SRA subsequently disavowed in submissions to the High Court. This confusion created a compliance vacuum that Mazur has now filled definitively.
Conclusion
The Mazur judgment represents a seismic shift in how law firms in England and Wales must approach the delegation of litigation work. The days of routinely permitting paralegals, trainees, and other non-qualified staff to conduct litigation – even under supervision – are over. Sheldon J’s judgment is unambiguous: mere employment by an authorised firm does not confer the right to conduct reserved legal activities, and supervision does not cure the absence of individual authorisation.
The message is clear: act now. Conduct an urgent audit, revise policies and practices, train staff, and engage with the SRA and your PII insurer if necessary. We had hoped that the SRA would shortly provide guidance to assist firms with the consequences of the judgment although, after two weeks of silence following the judgment, the SRA issued a brief statement on 1 October 2025 stating “…Our view is that the judgment in the recent case of Julia Mazur & Ora [sic] v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP doesn’t change the position in law…” and refers to its guidance on effective supervision mentioned above.
It goes on to say: “…The onus is on firms to satisfy themselves that they are complying with the LSA, and only authorised individuals are conducting litigation. We recommend you should be recording your decision-making around the approach you are taking (see 'Recording supervision arrangements' in the guidance)…” Whether any further guidance will be issued by the SRA remains to be seen.

Michael Blüthner Speight
MA (Oxon), Solicitor
Divisional Director
Legal Practices Group